An Economic and Public Health Preparedness Analysis on Personal Protective Equipment Tariffs in the COVID-19 Era by Song, Minsun
 
 
AN ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPARDNESS ANALYSIS ON 

















A capstone submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements  















© 2020 Minsun Song 




Existing research on the rise of trade protectionism during the Trump administration to 
recover the trade deficit and improve the unemployment rate suggests that high tariffs 
have protected countries’ national economies. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
many countries have posed restrictions, especially on personal protective equipment 
(PPE) to secure their domestic needs. This paper uses a multiple linear regression model 
to analyze whether there is a significant relationship between high PPE tariffs and a 
country’s economic and public health index profile. Results show that countries with 
large populations tend to impose higher tariffs on PPE than their average annual tariffs 
rate. It was also found that trade indices were more important indicators of PPE tariffs 
rate than public health preparedness indices. However, the evidence reveals that countries 
that scored highly on public health preparedness indices were still likely to impose tariffs 
restrictions on PPE products to protect their domestic supplies. 
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Nowadays, global trade has reached unprecedented level as a proportion of total 
world production,1 and in some countries, international trade brings mutual benefits like 
increasing the variety of goods and competition in the domestic market for consumers. 
However, in the current administration, President Trump argued that the U.S. trade deficit 
was caused by emerging Asian economies and need to eliminate these unfavorable trade 
agreements with renegotiations and tariffs.2 During the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, this 
trade protectionism practice has been enforced as most of countries pose higher tariffs on 
PPE (Personal protective equipment) to secure their domestic use.  
Tariff is one of common predictors to estimate the trade protectionism in existing 
socio-economic studies. Some academic researchers suggest the positive relationships 
between the size of government and trade openness in the majority of countries.3 Non-
tariffs restrictions, like government regulations that limit the right to exchange, gain 
credit, labor standards or business operation intervention, can be an alternative of tariffs. 
At the same time, some countries pose a variety of measures to protect their local 
businesses and manufacturers.4 Most often, the tariff rate is common index or predictor 
that has been defined or studied to measure economy’s trade protectionism or their 
liberalization stance, but few studies have looked at it individually. 
                                                          
1 Martín Lizaso, Laura. “International Trade in Medical Products: An analysis of Spanish Imports 
of Pharmaceutical products and personal protective equipment”, (Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y 
Empresariales, 2020), 1.  
2 Lin, Justin Yifu, and Xin Wang. “Trump Economics and China–US Trade Imbalances.” Journal 
of Policy Modeling, 40, no. 3, (2018), 579–600 
3 Epifani, Paolo, and Gino Gancia. “Openness, Government Size and the Terms of Trade.” Review 
of Economic Studies, 76, no. 2, (2009), 629–668 
4 Cheong et al. “The Trade Effects of Tariffs and Non-Tariffs Changes of Preferential Trade 
Agreements.” Economic Modelling, 70, no. F15, (2018), 370–382 
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However, in a current COVID-19 situation, most countries pose under name of health 
privacy or medical protectionism to secure their personal protective equipment (PPE) 
supplies. World imports of PPE in 2019 was $131.47 billion, whereas exports added up 
to $139.42 billion.5 Top PPE product exporters like the U.S., China, Vietnam and 
Germany still face a shortage of PPE due to the fact that the containment measures 
prevent factories from producing. For example, Germany imposed export licensing 
requirements on certain PPE products due to anticipated shortage in the country on 
March of 2020.6 
This paper seeks to understand what the main predictors for countries’ PPE tariff 
rates in the very unprecedented pandemic situation are, using the countries’ economic 
index and public health index profile. In order to test these relationships, the empirical 
strategy adopts in this paper using multi linear regression model analysis to investigate 
the relationship among these variables. Using 2019 Economic Freedom of the World 
Index from Frasier institute and 2019 Global Health Security Index from165 countries, 
this research finds that trade indices were more important indicators of PPE tariffs rates 
than public health preparedness indices. 
The paper starts with reviewing of past literature about what predictors have been 
studied to have an impact on tariff rates. Then, this paper provides information on the 
main characteristics of the dependent and independent variables. In Section 3, it will 
describe how health preparedness levels are different from countries’ income size 
                                                          
5 As defined by World Trade Organization (2020) 
6 Sithanonxay, Suvannaphakdy. “Tackling COVID-19 in ASEAN: Sustain an Open Trade Policy 




comparable to the overall tariffs’ percentage. Then investigate the difference between 
PPE and general tariff rates by each of the countries’ population size in section 4. Finally, 
this paper overview which variable—economic or health preparedness level— have a 
greater impact on PPE tariffs. The article concludes by discussing the direction of future 
research on PPE related tariffs and non-tariffs measurements.  
 
2. Literature Review  
A robust research literature exists regarding how economic features have an impact 
on tariff rates. For example, Kim suggests in his paper “Economic growth and tariff 
levels in the United States: A Granger causality analysis” that domestic business growth 
has unidirectional impacts on tariffs in the short term.7 Using Granger causality, the 
paper concludes that the U.S. trade policies have been influenced by the U.S.’ economic 
performance. Kim refers to a study by McKeown which demonstrates that economic 
growth influenced the level of trade protection in the U.S. between 1854 and 1914.8 Also, 
Kim’s research provides empirical evidence that the previous level(s) of tariffs protection 
affect the current levels of tariffs protection and economic growth in the U.S. This 
provides some theoretical hypothesis that previous tariff rates and non-tariffs 
measurements may affect the current level of tariffs, which will be analyzed with trade 
freedom level and previous year’s import and export size.   
                                                          
7 Kim, Hyung Min. “Economic Growth and Tariffs Levels in the United States: A Granger 
Causality Analysis.”, Journal of International Studies, 11, no. 4, (2018), 79–92. 
8 McKeown, Timothy J. “Firms and Tariffs Regime Change: Explaining the Demand for 
Protection.”, World Politics, 36, no. 2, (1984), 215–233. 
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Some influential research has suggested there is a negative relationship between 
country size and trade openness and country size and government size, and these may 
account for the positive association between trade openness and government size. Ram 
analyzed9 these relationships using OLS estimates with 41-year panel data for over 150 
countries. Adopting previous work from Rodrick,10 country size was proxied by 
population; and ratio of trade (imports + exports) to GDP was the measure of openness in 
his research. He also found that in a fixed-effect format, does not support the negative 
relationship between country size and both government size and openness but rather 
found the positive relationship among them. Similarly, further research from Epifani and 
Gancia suggest that there is a positive relationship between the size of government and 
trade openness in most countries.11 This pattern was found by Cameron in 18 OECD 
countries and extended this research to broader country data samples.  
Ray, who first to analyze systemically the cross-national structure of tariffs, 
calculated the average tariffs for 225 U.S.’ commodity classification across 7 countries 
(Canada, U.K., Germany, Belgium, Italy, France and Japan) and found out that foreign 
tariffs were negatively related to labor and skill intensity of production. In general, the 
U.S. tariffs provide more restrictive protection to those industries if the U.S. companies 
are not leading the industry due to lack of low level of skill intensity.12 Inspired by Ray’s 
study, Conybeare suggests different predictors of tariff levels, both in the developed and 
                                                          
9 Ram, Rati. “Openness, Country Size, and Government Size: Additional Evidence from a Large 
Cross-Country Panel.”, Journal of Public Economics, 93, no. 1–2, (2009), 213–218. 
10 Rodrik, D. “Why do more open economies have bigger governments?”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 106, (1998), 997–1032. 
11 Epifani and Gancia. “Openness, Government Size and the Terms of Trade.” 
12 Ray, Edward John. "The optimum commodity tariffs and tariffs rates in developed and less 
developed countries.", The Review of Economics and Statistics, 56, No. 3, (1974), 369-377. 
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developing countries: the nature of the international system, intergovernmental power 
and influence of non-profit or interest groups.13 
 Not only tariffs, but non-tariffs measures, such as a government regulation that 
limits the right to exchange, gain credit, labor standards or business operation 
intervention, can be alternative of tariff.14 Trade openness indices evaluate not only 
current and past tariff rates but also non-tariffs measures by posing import and export 
processing fees and government export control regulations.  
Before the COVID-19 crisis, many WTO countries had been charged high tariffs on 
imported PPE products such as medical devices, medicines, disinfectants, and soap.15 
Because big exporters of world (U.S., China, Japan, Germany, Britain, France and Italy) 
have been hit hard by the virus in the first quarter of 2020, trade restrictive policies are 
now mostly anti-export, which affects 65% of world manufacturing.16 In addition to 
import barriers, many countries’ lawmakers introduced export barriers on PPE and food 
exports during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. 
Although existing literature have examined some economic indexes attribute the rate 
of tariffs in general, no research has investigated in this special circumstance under the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Most countries put out the reason of high PPE tariffs and non-
tariffs measures to secure their domestic needs, however, this current study aims to 
investigate whether high PPE tariffs are caused according to countries’ domestic needs by 
                                                          
13 Conybeare, John A.C. “Tariffs protection in developed and developing countries: a cross-
sectional and longitudinal analysis”, International Organization, 37, no. 3, (1983), 441-463. 
14 Cheong et al. “The Trade Effects of Tariffs and Non-Tariffs Changes of Preferential Trade 
Agreements.”  
15 Stellinger et al. “How Trade Can Fight the Pandemic and Contribute to Global Health.”, CEPR 
Press, 1, no. 2, (2020), 21–30. 
16 Baldwin, Richard, and Simon J. Evenett. "Covid-19 and Trade Policy: Why turning inward 
won’t work.", CEPR Press, (2020), 2-14. 
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comparing the impact of economic independent variable and countries’ health properness 
level.   
 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Independent Variable 
In recent social science and economic studies about economic freedom, researchers 
use two most prominent indicators developed by the Fraser Institute and the Heritage 
Foundation. Both measurements use government size, tax rates, and business freedom as 
subgroups to analyze the holistic economic freedom index. Hartmann and Uhlenbruck17 
states in their research that the Economic World Freedom Index (EWFI) from Fraser 
Institute is more precise and transparent information than the Heritage Index. For this 
study, EWFI is chosen since it is from a non-partisan institute whereas the Heritage 
Foundation is a renowned conservative think tank. Also, both indexes are highly 
correlated.18 In EWFI’s 2019 world report, it ranked 162 countries based on five areas—
size of government, legal structure and property rights, access to sound money, freedom 
of trade internationally (in this paper, it will be referred as “Trade Freedom”) and 
regulation of credit and labor in business (referred as “Domestic Business regulation”). 
Size of government, trade freedom, and domestic business regulation are selected as 
independent variables to measure overall economic freedom. All indexes range is 
between 0 to 10 with higher values indicating more freedom. Lastly, Caudill and Zanella 
                                                          
17 Hartmann, Julia, and Klaus Uhlenbruck. “National Institutional Antecedents to Corporate 
Environmental Performance”, Journal of World Business, 50, no. 4, (2015), 729–741. 
18 Hanke, S. H., & Walters, S.J.K. “Economic freedom, prosperity, and equality: A survey”, CATO 
Journal, (1997), 17-117 
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stated in their research that the components of the indices are orthogonal, this could be 
done without multicollinearity problems in regression models.19 
For the public health preparedness measurement, the Global Health Security (GHS) 
Index, developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Johns Hopkins Center for 
Health Security is used in this paper. This index is developed by combining six different 
categories: prevention, Detection and Reporting, Rapid Response, Health System, 
Compliance with International Norms, and Risk Environment.20 This index is 0- 100 
scale analyzing 195 countries worldwide. Before analyzing a multiple linear regression 
model, this study reviews how the global health security level differs according to a 
country’s income. As shown in figure 1, the countries with high incomes tend to score 
higher global health preparedness compared to those with low incomes.  
                                                          
19 Caudill et al. "Is economic freedom one dimensional? A factor analysis of some common 
measures of economic freedom.", Journal of economic development, 25, no. 1, (2000), 17-40. 
20 Global Health Security Index. (n.d.). GHS INDEX 2019. https://www.ghsindex.org/about/ 































Source: GHS Index Website  
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According to figure 1, an average overall GHS index score is 40.2, while 60 high-
income countries scored 51.9.21 However, 116 high- and middle-income countries do not 
score above 50. According to the 2019 GHS report, “GHS Index Global Health Security 
Index”, fewer than 7% of countries which scored in the highest tier can prevent the 












7.01 1.797 0.194 9.469 
Government 
Size 
6.637 1.099 3.333 9.505 
Population 
(Million) 
52.26 178.316 0.10 1395.40 
Global Health 
Security Index 
72.81 27.64 2.80 99.90 
Import ($) 7.898e+09 20,365,338,401 3.000e+06 1.800e+11 
Export ($) 8.094e+09 21,367,917,882 5.480e+02 1.380e+11 
 
Lastly, the 2019 world export and import data from UN Comtrade Database 
center is used to study the relationship between countries’ trade size and PPE tariff rates. 
Using HS 2017 code, all 2019 PPE related export and import trade values will be 
                                                          
21 Cameron et al. “GHS Index Global Health Security Index”, NTI & Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
school of public health, https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2019-Global-Health-
Security-Index.pdf, (accessed October 20, 2020) 




extracted. This list includes medicine, medical supplies, medical equipment, and personal 
protective products (See appendix B). The underlying hypothesis states that if countries 
are extensive exporters, they already have strong supply chains to produce their own 
goods. At the same time, import data will be used to see if countries rely on most of their 
PPE products from global import, and how this impacts the tariff rates. 
Table 1 shows the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum value 
of independent variables. After examining table 1, 2019 PPE export and import values 
are too large scale compared to other independent variables. To balance out the range of 
trade values, this study adapts log transformation in export and import variables. Most of 
the time, log transformation is often used in economic analysis to stabilize the variance of 
a series (LÜTKEPOHL et al., 2009). 
3.2 Dependent Variables 
Average applied Most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff rates on PPE from the World 
Trade Organization database is used as a dependent variable in this study. MFN tariff is 
the one that WTO member countries, promise to impose all trading partners unless the 
country is part of a preferential trade agreement, which means it is the highest and most 
restrictive tariff that WTO members can charge one another.22 Since World Trade 
Organization (WTO) only provides its members notified data from 122 countries, there is 
a data limitation problem in PPE MFN tariff rates. To build more accurate model 
analysis, 40 missing values are recoded with a mean value in this study. Same as 2019 
                                                          
22 World Trade Organization. Blog, WTO, 2020, https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/picture-trade-
types-tariffs-explained, (Accessed 11.25.2020)  
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PPE export and import trade values, PPE MFN tariff values are exported based on the 
Harmonized System (HS) Classification.23 
4. Results 












In figure 2, most of the countries’ PPE tariffs fall between 0-5 %. Generally, in Figure 
2, more countries pose higher PPE tariff rates than their general tariff rates during the 
                                                          
23 World Trade Organization, “How WTO Members have used trade measures to expedite access 
to COVID-19 critical medical goods and services”, WTO, 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/services_report_16092020_e.pdf (accessed 10.20.2020). 
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COVID-19 pandemic. Countries with a larger population tend to impose a higher tariff 
rates in PPE than general tariffs in 2020. It can be interpreted that countries with a large 
population would like to secure domestic use of PPE by imposing higher tariffs than 
average. However, except very populated countries such as those who have more than a 
billion population, the linear regression graph does not show a significant relationship 
between PPE tariff rates and population variable.  
4.2 Multiple linear Regression 
 
Multi linear regression analysis is used to set up a useful relationship between a 
dependent variable y and diverse predictors.24 To compare all independent variables 
suggested above, it is easier to use a multiple regression approach to see how each 
predictor’s covariates and adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 value have been changed. The hypothesis can be 
expressed in the following regression model for the relationship between dependent 
variable Y and independent variables A, B and C, etc. 
Y = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1A + 𝛽𝛽2B +𝛽𝛽3C +···+ ε 
The aim of this paper’s analysis is to see if countries’ economic and health 
preparedness indices have an impact on the level of PPE tariff rates and, if so, then to 
identify the impact of the interaction. As stated in the literature review, this study will 
compare gradually how economic indices like trade openness, government size and non-
tariff measure have an impact on the PPE tariff rates in the first model. In the Model 2, 
the health security level index was added to investigate the relationship with the PPE 
tariff rates. The third model will solely investigate how countries import and export size 
                                                          
24 Gan, Sarimah Omar, and Sabri Ahmad. “Multiple Linear Regression to Forecast Balance of 
Trade.”, Journal of Fundamental Sciences, 7, (2011), 150-155 
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affect the PPE tariff rates. Unlike other independent variables, there is no relevant 
academic research about how export and import size of countries impact tariff rates in 
general. By analyzing this model, it will give some sense of empirical analysis and how 
these two factors attribute to PPE tariff rates. Lastly, all independent variables are used in 
Model 4. Ultimately, a total of four multi-linear regression models were estimated to 
explore the impact of independent variables by comparing how their covariates and 
adjusted squared R values different with others.  
In the first model, EWFI’s economic freedom variables are used as quantitative 
factors to analyze the relationship between the MFN tariffs and countries’ economic 
statuses. The second model, the global health security index has been added as a public 
health preparedness measure. The third model analyzes 2019 export and import value on 
PPE products, adopting log transformation to balance out the range of values. In model 1 
and 2, trade freedom has significant negative impact on the PPE MFN tariff rates (p 
<0.001). In the Model 1, a one unit increase in country’s trade freedom index decreases 
probability of PPE tariff rates by 1.494 %, holding country’s government size, 
population, domestic business regulation, health preparedness level, and import and 
export size constant. Whereas in Model 2, the probability of PPE tariff is decreased by 
0.082. The reported impacts are both statistically significant at a 5% significance level. A 
one-point increase in government size index will increase PPE MFN tariff rates by 
0.375 % (Model 1) and 0.401 % (Model 2) accordingly. Comparatively, the global health 
security index is not shown as significant predictor of PPE tariff rates compare to 
economic indices. One point increase of the global health security index is associated 
with increases of PPE tariff rates by 0.0129 % in the Model 2 which is lower than all 
13 
 
three economic indexes (Trade freedom, domestic business regulation and government 
size). Compared to EWFI economic indices, trade size does not have a significant impact 
on PPE tariffs in Model 3. As 1% of import size increase is associated with 0.1186 
decreases in PPE tariff rates whereas 1% of the increase in export size increases the PPE 
tariff rates by 0.0986.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  12.1978 12.2021 7.3084 17.3733 














































































     
N 162 162 162 162 
 
 Source: Fraser Institute, UN Comrade Database, WTO Database, GHS Index Website  
***p < 0.001 ** p <0.05 * p < 0.01 




Model 4 has quite interesting result as trade freedom, global health preparedness 
level, import and export variables show higher covariates values in aggregated model 
when compared to Model 1 and Model 3. Assessing adjusted R squared value, which 
gives good indication how much variation is explained by model, Model 4 is slightly 
better option to explain with 34% of variability of the response data around its mean than 
other models. Using the data in Table 2, the following multiple regression estimate is 
obtained: 
𝑌𝑌 �= 17.373 – 1.669(0.273)×Trade Freedom – 
0.093
(0.152)×Domestic Biz Regulation +  
0.395




(0.027)×Health Preparedness  
– 0.388(0.238)×Log(Import) + 
0.126
(0.134)×Log(Export) 
Trade freedom variable inevitably influenced both import and export values since it is 
broader trade-policy measure based on data collected from the International Monetary 
Fund and World Trade Organization.25 However, the resulting index captures the general 
tariff rates and regulatory trade barriers of 2019 and each country’s trade and capital 
policy stance,26 whereas 2019 PPE export and import value only describes the import and 
manufacturing size of PPE products. As shown in Annex A, even import and export 
variables scored relatively high on the VIF test on a Model 3 (Export: 5.1864, Import: 
5.1864) and Model 4 (Export: 5.9924 Import: 6.0549) compare to other independent 
                                                          
25 Gwartney, et al. “Economic Freedom of the World 2019 Annual Report.”, Fraser Institute, 10, 
(2019) 
26 Wagner, Patrick and Plouffe, Michael. “Electoral systems and trade-policy outcomes: the effects 
of personal-vote incentives on barriers to international trade”, Public Choice, 180, (2018), 333–352.  
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variables. However, all independent variables scored less than 10 in VIF test, so there are 
no multicollinearity problems in all models.  
Overall, the model analysis shows that if countries have more conservative stance in 
terms of trade or moreover, they are not the main PPE product importer, they are less 
likely to impose higher PPE tariffs than others. The global health security index also 
suggests that there is a positive correlation between PPE MFN tariffs and GHS index.  
 
5 Conclusion 
This study aimed to research economic and public health indicators affecting the PPE 
tariff rate of countries by measuring trade freedom, government size, domestic business 
regulation, population, global health preparedness level and the export and import size of 
PPE products. The results of this analysis show that the trade openness is predictive of 
the PPE tariff rate (p <0.001). Specifically, an increase of one point of countries’ trade 
openness index is associated with a decrease of 1.669 PPE tariff rate (%). This result 
indicates that countries general tariffs, non-tariff measures, compliance costs for trade, 
black-market exchange rates, financial openness and, foreign labor immigration policies 
have largely affected PPE tariff rates in 2020. One point of domestic business regulations 
is associated with a decrease of 0.093 % of the PPE tariff rate. However, a one-point 
increase in government size index is associated with a 0.395% increase in tariffs rate 
(p<0.01). This is an interesting result that government size, which includes government 
consumption, transfers investment, and top marginal tax rate is the second highest 
indicator in the final model. This result can be interpreted by the fact that countries with a 
16 
 
big government system tend to pose high tariffs to secure their domestic needs during the 
pandemic. Another thing to note in the model’s results is that countries are unlikely to 
pose a high tariff if they are large importers where they rely on other trading countries’ 
manufacturing system. In Model 4, 1% increase of export size is associated with a 
0.1266 % increase of the PPE tariff rates whereas 1% increase of import size is associated 
with 0.388 decrease of PPE tariffs. Which means, countries are likely to pose higher 
tariffs if they are a large exporter of PPE products. Furthermore, health preparedness 
levels have a relatively minimal positive impact as a one point of the health security level 
increase is associated with a 0.032% increase of the PPE tariff rate, compared to other 
economic predictors. This new development contradicts previous supposition since the 
general assumption is that countries with high health preparedness levels are less likely to 
build trade boundaries to protect their domestic medical supplies needs during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Even countries with high health preparedness levels still need to 
secure their domestic needs due to lack of supplies in this unprecedented pandemic crisis. 
The population variable, in general, does not have a significant impact on the PPE tariff 
rates unless countries have above one billion citizens in total population.  
A limitation this study faces is that even though this research investigates current 
issues, it is too premature to generalize that economic indices impact more than health 
preparedness to determine the PPE tariff rates. As stated in the beginning of this research, 
the COVID-19 crisis is a very unprecedented incident that impacts on both the global 
economy and the public health policy unlike previous major pandemics. This study only 
investigated the relationship between 2019 trade openness and economic policy data with 
2020 tariff rate. There might be staggered impact from the previous economic situation 
17 
 
before the COVID-19 pandemic. It is challenging to conclude whether the public health 
policy of various countries will be a major predictor of PPE tariff rates in the long term.  
Many trade and policy researchers point out that the trade will serve as a powerful 
tool, suggesting that lawmakers in countries should develop the policies that aim to 
stimulate domestic production and also facilitate international trade of PPE. They suggest 
that trade barriers in place limit access to PPE products and make them unnecessarily 
costly. Future studies should focus on whether these PPE tariffs and non-tariff measures27 
are effective in terms of securing domestic needs and preventing the global pandemic. 
This study can help to understand what predictor impacted the PPE tariff rate as an initial 
response of the COVID-19 crisis.  
                                                          
27 Sithanonxay, “Tackling COVID-19 in ASEAN: Sustain an Open Trade Policy on Personal 
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7 Appendices   
Appendix A 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 


































Log(Import)    5.1864 
 
6.0549 
Log(Export)    5.1864 
 
5.9924 
Notes: As a general rule, a vif>10 indicates a multi-collinearity problem28.  
Appendix B 
 
PPE Sub-category HS 2017 Code 
Pharmaceuticals 300213, 300214, 300215, 300219, 300220, 300310, 
300320, 300331, 300339, 300341, 300342, 300343, 
300349, 300360, 300390, 300410, 300420, 300431, 
300432, 300439, 300441, 300442, 300443, 300449, 
300450, 300460, 300490 
Medical Supplies 220710, 284700, 300120, 300190, 300212, 300290, 
300510, 300590, 300610, 300620, 300630, 300650, 
300670, 340212, 340213, 350400, 350790, 370110, 
370210, 380894, 382100, 382200, 392620, 401490, 
                                                          
28 Kabacoff, Robert. “R in Action : Data Analysis and Graphics with R: 2nd Edition”, Shelter Island, 2015 
Table 1-VIF Test  
Table 2-List of PPE Product’s’ HS code  
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401511, 301519, 701710, 701720, 701790, 901831, 
901832, 901839 
Medical Equipment 841920, 901050, 901110, 901180, 901811, 901812, 
901813, 901814, 901819, 901820, 901890, 901920, 
902150, 902212, 902214, 902219, 902221, 902229, 902230 
 
 
Source: World Trade Organization   
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